The Political Role of Clans in Central Asia

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Ethnonational and religious identity has been highlighted as a causal variable in the protracted conflicts of the last decade in the former Soviet Union, eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia. However, it has not led to conflict in post-Soviet Central Asia. To explain its absence, it is necessary to focus on the clan as the critical unit of analysis in Central Asia. Studies of conflict and transition have ignored the clan. By focusing on the clan, it is possible to understand the limits of ethnonational and religious identity mobilization and thus the absence of identity-based conflict. Clan dynamics also better explain why and how conflict occurs.

The long-term rise in ethnic war, from 1945 to 1998, has put identity conflict at the center of scholarly concerns.[1] Realists, rational choice theorists, and constructivists alike often advocate an implicitly essentialist view of identity groups as actors in conflict.[2] Assuming that ethnic or religious differences lead to or form the basis of nationalism, many scholars predict conflict when an ethnic group and state boundaries do not coincide.[3] Yet few studies look at a range of potential identities and ask why some identities are more salient than others. Further, few explore the social roots of stability or nonconflict. A methodologically complete research agenda must address instances of both conflict and nonconflict.[4] How is the absence of ethnic and religious conflict in Central Asia explained? Data from three Central Asian countries—Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan—suggest that clan identity is more salient than ethnonationality and religion and is the critical variable in understanding stability and conflict.[5]

Ronald Suny has argued that "Western scholars erred most egregiously in deducing behavior from essential religious and cultural characteristics" of Central Asia.[6] In contrast to their assumptions, ethnonationality and religion are not always powerful mobilizing identities. The clan is an informal identity network based on kinship ties and is common in semimodern societies. In such societies identities embedded in informal networks such as clans are stronger than formally institutionalized ethnonational and religious identities.[7] The data here suggest an alternative to hypotheses about identity conflict. Where clan networks are powerful social actors, they deter ethnonational or religious conflict and foster social stability. However, clans themselves may define other fault lines of conflict.[8] The data here do not offer an overarching explanation of interethnic peace, but they do explain the social roots of clan identity and power and illuminate the causal mechanism by which clans promote stability or conflict at the nonelite, mass level. Finally, the data suggest that,

where clans are such powerful social actors, they will play a role in the elite-level politics of transition, negotiation, and conflict as well. Future research should focus on clans in explaining political behavior in such societies.[9]

Rethinking Identity Conflict

Many scholars have argued that the Soviet institutionalization of ethnonationality, the Soviet collapse into ethnonational republics, and global norms supporting ethnic self-determination set that stage for identity mobilization and have predicted the rise of ethnonational and religious conflict in Central Asia.[10] Some expected elites to reconstruct and mobilize such identities in instrumental ways.[11] Others posited that independence and democratization would create many more disadvantaged ethnic or religious minorities. These groups, feeling discrimination and fear, would mobilize in reaction to states engaged in nation-building.[12] Still others argued that a weak state would create a security dilemma among ethnic or religious groups, leading to violence.[13] Many further anticipated that the major fault-line of conflict would develop between the former colonizers and colonized ethnic groups.[14] Whatever the precise mechanism, studies of post-Soviet transitions generally interpreted conflicts through the lens of ethnic and religious conflict.[15] Central Asia, plagued by numer-

Table 1a Conflict in Eurasia by Region (1992–2000)

Region	Number (1992-2001)[a]	Place of Conflict	Type of Conflict
East Europe	5	Yugoslavia, Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo	Ethnonational, secessionist
Western NIS	1	Moldova	Ethnonational, secessionist
South Caucasus	3	ssetia, Abkhazia, Chechnya, -Karabakh	Ethnonational, secessionist
NorthCaucasus /Russia	3	South Ossetia, Chechnya 1, Chechnya 2	Ethnonational, secessionist
Central Asia	1	Tajikistan	Clan power-struggle

[a] Gurr, *Ethnic Conflict in World Politics*, (Boulder: Westview: 1994). I have updated the data.

Table 1b Conflict in Central Asia (1985–2001)

Republic/ State	Incident of Conflict 1985-1991	Type of Conflict/ Cause	Incident of Conflict 1992-2001	Type of Conflict/ Cause	ocal Social nvolvement	Risk Index (2000)**
Kazakhstan	1. Protests (Dec. 1986)	1.Nationalist	None	None	1.High	-.70
Kyrgyzstan	1. Riots/ communal violence (June 1990)	1. Land – ethnic overtones	2.Guerilla incursions from Tajikistan (1999-2001)	2. Regional "Islamic" guerilla force	1.Moderate 2.None	0.15
Tajikistan	1. Student Riots (Dushanbe, Feb. 1990)	1. Anti-gov/bread prices	2. Civil War (1992-1997)	2. Political/ economic	1.Low 2.High	-2.43
urkmenistan	1. Student Riots (Ashgabad, 1990)	1. Anti-gov/ bread prices	None	None	1.Low	-5.82
Uzbekistan	1.Communal violence (Fergbana, June 1989)	1.Housing/ Land – with ethnic overtones	2. Guerilla incursions from Tajikistan (1999,2000)	2. Regional "Islamic" guerilla force	1.Moderate 2.Low or none	-5.82

** Gurr's indicator is based on an assessment of the Russian ethnopolitical minority. A lower score is a lower risk. See Gurr (2000), D-2.

ous ethnonational and religious minorities, the worst economic conditions, and the newest and weakest states of Eurasia, seemed a likely locus of conflict. Yet, as shown in Table 1, Central Asia exhibits the lowest level of ethnonational/religious conflict in the region.

Democratic theory hypothesizes that democratic institutions, ethnic power sharing, and inclusive language laws prevent identity conflict. Economic approaches argue that equal economic opportunity, privatization, and growth prevent conflict. Yet the Central Asian countries suggest that a focus on formal institutions is inadequate. Ethnonational and religious stability is found in very different political and economic institutional contexts: in authoritarian, economically centralized Uzbekistan, semidemocratic, market-oriented Kyrgyzstan, and weakly authoritarian, centralized Tajikistan. Furthermore, despite informal ethnic discrimination by all three states against nontitulars, especially in the allocation of jobs and patronage, conflict has not erupted. All three states resisted or were slow to adopt bilingual language laws. Each sponsored massive nation-building campaigns that privileged the titular group's culture. And in each ethnic entrepreneurs demanded greater political representation, economic and cultural rights, and sovereignty but failed to mobilize a mass following. The argument that the 1989–1990 riots prevented further conflict is suspect, since early violence in Yugoslavia and the Caucasus evolved into ethnic wars.[16] Social stability in an otherwise turbulent Central Asia has thus been a surprising phenomenon that requires a reconsideration of identity and conflict. To analyze nonevents, such as interethnic peace, it is necessary to find causal processes at work in conditions of peace.[17] The clan, a variable common to these countries, therefore offers a more compelling explanation of nonconflict.

Three Faces of Culture: Ethnonationality, Religion, and Clan[18]

Laitin has observed that multiple faces of culture exist within a society. One face is ethnonationality, the common cultural and linguistic traits and shared history or heritage. Soviet nationalities policy specifically linked ethnies to politically recognized and territorially defined groups. Religious identity, a second face of culture, is an ideological or civilizational identity based on doctrinal affiliation.[19] Clan identity is a third face of culture in many semimodern societies in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. The clan is a unit of analysis addressed by neither comparativist nor international relations hypotheses on identity and conflict.[20] Clans have often been entirely ignored or dismissed as primordial. However, the clan can be approached conceptually and theoretically as a collective identity network.

Measuring identity, especially collective identity, is a challenge. Clans are informal social organizations in which kinship or "fictive" kinship is the core, unifying bond among group members.[21] Clans are identity networks consisting of an exten-

sive web of horizontal and vertical kin-based relations. Clans are rooted in a culture of kin-based norms and trust but also serve rational purposes. As a transaction cost analysis suggests, informal ties and networks reduce the high transaction costs of making deals in a low or weakly institutionalized and highly uncertain environment.[22] In semimodern and especially transitional states, clans in fact serve as an alternative to the formal institutions of markets and state bureaucracies. Their particularistic ties and repeated interaction builds rational trust and "mutual exchange reciprocity."[23] They enable contracting over time and the informal institutionalization of these norms.[24] Clans thus provide the normative and organizational basis for internally powerful and cohesive networks.

Clans include both elite and nonelite members, at different levels of society and state. Clan elites are those with power, and often money, who through birth and accomplishment have status and prominence within the clan. Clan elites can be regional governors and kolkhoz chairmen, if the clan is powerful, or simply village elders in a less powerful clan. In either case, elites are normatively and rationally bound to the well-being of their clan network. They provide political, social, and economic opportunities to their network and rely on its loyalty and respect to maintain their status. Nonelites are both normatively and rationally bound to them.

Like ethnicity and religious affiliation, the clan provides an identity. However, the critical element is kinship, not language, culture, or religion. Clans are intraethnic and intrareligious groups. Unlike clientelism, clans are entire webs or networks of relations, horizontal and vertical, which remain bound by identity bonds as the economic necessity of patronage rises and falls. Although often regionally based, since localism helps maintain ties, clans depend upon the genealogical relationship, which endures with migration.

Method: Collecting Identity Data

To understand the conceptual basis of identity and identity conflict, data on identities were collected through ethnographic participant observation and 313 open-ended, in-depth interviews (two to three hours each) in 1997 and 1998. Interview sites were a representative sample of oblasts in rural and semirural regions, but respondents were not a statistically random sample. Telephone sampling was not possible where most people lacked telephones. Surveys risked government monitoring and offered problematic results. Nonetheless, respondents represented a sample based on occupation, class, gender, and age.[25] Where the interviews revealed strong patterns of identity, beliefs, and behavior, the results suggested an underlying social reality.

The study focused on rural and semirural areas because 80 percent of the population is rural. Observers anticipated conflict there. I evaluated the presence and strength of

clan identities by observing their behavior within the local rural units, the village and kolkhoz. The oblast sites varied in ethnic composition and degree of Islamicization to allow comparison of clan, ethnonationality, and religion within the sample.[26] Variation in the geographic and economic basis of oblasts allowed observation of identity variation within the cases. The Ferghana Valley regions, where ethnic divisions and Islamic activism were highest, were the toughest cases for the argument.[27]

In a series of eighty questions, interviews addressed the following general issue. How does the clan, as opposed to ethnonational or religious identities, affect sociopolitical behavior? And does the clan contribute to social stability in post-Soviet Central Asia? The interviews disaggregated these three layers of identity so as to explore the power of each in social mobilization and conflict.

The Clan as Political Actor and Identity

Clan identity must be examined along several dimensions: how strongly its features are present in rural Central Asia, whether and how it has survived the post-Soviet transition, and how it relates to ethnonationality and Islam. Due to space constraints, I will focus more on the clan and only on key aspects of ethnonational and religious identity. Examination of clan identity will illuminate its role in fostering stability or fomenting conflict.

Measuring an informal identity is by definition difficult. I therefore developed a number of indicators to assess the presence and relevance of clan identity networks. As with other identities, it is important to note the use of language to express clan identity. In the interview study, I assessed the rational and normative strength of clans by focusing questions on four areas: language, finances, living patterns and migration, and sociopolitical functions.

The Central Asian populations express the concept of clan in both their titular language and Russian. Although the essential features of clan identity are present almost universally in rural areas, the nature and expression of clan identity varies from Kyrgyz villages (*aul*) to Tajik and Uzbek villages (*qishloq* or *mahalla*), as well as by the rural geography and economy of these regions. Language frequently reveals these differences. Kyrgyz generally refer to either their historic tribe or clan. Kyrgyz use the traditional word *avlod*, as well as the Russian term *rod* or *klan*. They both refer to a clan name, which defines their kin-based network, located in a village or cluster of villages and collectives. In addition to blood, inhabitants are bound by extensive marital ties and thus are fictively members of the same clan.

The majority of ethnic Uzbeks inhabit long-settled agricultural areas.[28] Recent political factors have influenced local understandings of the term clan. Uzbeks often associate *klan* with the mafia and are thus reluctant to refer to their local network as

a clan. Uzbeks speak of their *rod* (the less charged Russian term), *urug,* or *avlod.* They consider not only their village, in which most inhabitants are somehow related by blood or fictive kinship, but usually several neighboring villages, linked by marital alliances, to be part of that clan.[29]

Such detailed data on Tajikistan are lacking. However, Tajiks also use the term *klan.* In recent survey results, 68 percent of respondents identified themselves as "members of a clan," despite the pervasiveness of Soviet and post-Soviet national construction. The Tajik regime has publicly denounced the political influence of clans. Clan divisions, however, frequently appear at the regional and subregional levels, where the Soviet regime transplanted entire Garmi, Pamiri, and Badakhshani clan villages to south-central Tajikistan in the 1950s and 1960s.

Although the Soviet regime had visibly homogenizing effects on clans' social structure, in settling nomadic clans and collectivizing agriculture the Soviets also preserved and fostered kin and clan villages and increased clans' territorial attachment.[30] Variations in clan type persist. For example, in Bukhara and Samarkand clans are often ethnically mixed. Differences are related more to geography and socioeconomics than to ethnonationality and religion. Whether *klan*, *rod*, *avlod*, or *urug*, language expresses the pervasiveness of clan identities throughout the region.

Financial practices are a second revealing indicator of clan networks, especially since 100 percent of nonelite respondents expressed serious concern over their economic circumstances and inability to sustain their household and extended family (typically seven to thirteen persons). *Kolkhozniki* (peasants/kolkhoz workers) in both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan claimed that their monthly salary approximated six to ten dollars. When enumerating their basic monthly expenses, they estimated at least four to five times their official salary. Yet 100 percent of nonelite respondents said that they had not received any loans from banks, government programs, or *kolkhozy* (collective farms) and that such loans were not available.[31]

Kolkhozniki elaborated a multistep strategy to obtain financial assistance. First, they turned to family members, especially to any *bai kormyator* (clan/kin patron responsible for the welfare of his clan). Second, lacking such relatives, they turned to a local *bai*, perhaps an *oqsoqol* (white beard, or elder) or other leader of their village. Third, they requested aid from the *qishloq* or *aul komiteti* (nonstate village committee) composed of several *oqsoqols* who attempt to ensure harmony within the village. Fourth, they turned to the kolkhoz director or *sel'sovet* (committee of local elites). The kolkhoz committee was the last resort. Unless the individual seeking the loan belonged to the clan of the kolkhoz director, he could be easily exploited. In Tajikistan, similarly, only 23 percent of respondents claimed to have received state subsidies; even lower numbers "expected such aid."[32] Financial issues thus enhanced the rationale for maintaining clan networks. Intraclan, kin-based patronage and reciprocity enabled individuals to survive periods of economic instability.

In response to concrete questions about living patterns and preferences, the interviewees expressed a traditional, prenational, and apolitical mentality, together with rational arguments for their beliefs. Social norms against out-migration were strong. Except for married women (who usually came from a neighboring village), 99 percent of respondents had been born in the village where they lived. Most men had left for compulsory Soviet military service, but the majority had returned and settled near their kin. When an estimated 50 percent of the population of each state lacked official employment, leaving the kin group was risky. In fact, despite high unemployment, only 3.1 percent had registered with the state as unemployed. Most simply relied on their clan for informal jobs on private plots or in the black market.[33]

Low migration in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, either into or out of the village, is noteworthy. This trend continues despite relaxation of Soviet-era restrictions on movement to urban areas. The rural population has remained attached to its "traditional land" and local identity network and seldom migrates, despite economic motivations to do so. For instance, ethnic Uzbek citizens of Kyrgyzstan commonly perceive the Uzbek economy to be more stable. Yet 98 percent of respondents reported "almost no emigration" across the border to Uzbekistan. Similarly, ethnic Kyrgyz living in Uzbekistan have not attempted to migrate to Kyrgyzstan. In 1997 the outmigration rate of Uzbeks was less than 1 percent of the rural population of Uzbekistan.[34] Even in Tajikistan, 89 percent of survey respondents claimed that they did not plan to leave their native region.[35] By 1997 98 percent of the 600,000 internally displaced persons and 60,000 Tajik refugees in Afghanistan had returned to their home villages.[36] Central Asians remain reliant on kin-based trust and the traditional norms and practices of their local clan network. Just as the clan was covertly a means of advancement and protection during the Soviet period, in relatively good economic conditions, now the clan has proven a resilient identity and mechanism of survival in harsh exterior conditions.

Finally, clan identity networks persist in modern state contexts. Scholars have often dismissed clans and their hierarchies and loyalties as primordial; they ought to disappear in modernizing states like the Soviet Union and its successors. Nonetheless, respondents consistently reiterated the importance of clan norms, including kin unity and loyalty, multiple children, respect for one's elders, care for poorer relatives, and communal structures of life and work (such as family farms). These norms reinforce the centrality of the clan unit and communal way of life. Furthermore, committees of local clan patriarchs, often including the local *domla* (religious teacher) or *imom* (religious leader), assume most of the practical functions of governing daily life, functions ostensibly performed by state or district administrative institutions in modern states. Clan committees give counsel and make decisions about marriage, divorce (which is usually prevented as disruptive to the clan and interclan ties), internal family disputes, conflict between neighbors, in- and outmigration from the village, distribution of land, informal taxes, redistribution to the

poor, communal feasts, interethnic disputes, religious education and practices, village relations with the kolkhoz directorship, and even the appointment of local militia. Since 1992 the Uzbek state has enhanced its popular legitimacy by legalizing these historically informal institutions. The responses to the questions in Table 2 indicate the depth and importance of clan functions.

In autocratic Uzbekistan it is unsurprising that individuals avoid the procurator and courts, yet this informalization of law is also common in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Village clan committees almost always usurp the role of the state courts. Islamic courts, abolished by the Soviet regime, have not been revived. Clan elders and notables govern according to local traditions, mores, and *adat* (customary tribal law); they did so covertly under the Soviet Union and do so overtly now. In both democratic Kyrgyzstan and authoritarian Uzbekistan only one respondent claimed to have used the state courts, which were unanimously viewed as a last resource, if one at all. Such deep-seated aversion to formal legal mechanisms and judicial procedures has set Kyrgyzstan apart from other semidemocracies of the postcommunist bloc. Increased reliance upon the clan is slowing, if not preventing, the social processes that studies of transitions, institutions, and identity predicted; urbanization and identification with modern, supralocal collectivities, national and state, are minimal. Likewise, reliance on clans decreases attraction to supraclan Islamic and ethnic movements.[37]

Table 2 The Role of Clans

1.What factor is most important in getting a job, economic advancement, and political advancement?

	Responses				
Locale of Respondents	Education	Government Agency	Mosque	Money/ "Bribe"	Family/Clan Connections
Kyrgyzstan	<1%	0	0	11.7%	87.6%
Uzbekistan	0	0	0	31%	69%

2.When you need a loan or financial assistance, where do you turn for help?

	Responses				
Locale of Respondents	Bank	Government Agency	Mosque	Kolkhoz Committee	Family/Clan Connections
Kyrgyzstan	1%	2%	0	4%	93%
Uzbekistan	2%	3%	0	3%	92%

3.When you need a conflict (other than a violent crime) resolved, where do you turn for help?

	Responses				
Locale of Respondents	Courts	Government Agency	Mosque	Kolkhoz Committee	Family/Clan Connections
Kyrgyzstan	0	0	0	3%	97%
Uzbekistan	0	0	2%	2%	96%

These four aspects of the clan establish its rational and normative content as an identity network and its persistence through modernization and transition. Clans are not formally institutionalized, but are deeply embedded in the economic structure and culture of semimodern societies. Most critically, the clan's roles suggest how it creates a local causal mechanism that decreases the potential for ethnonational or religious conflict. How do the nature and strength of clans compare with other identities?

Ethnonational Identity

Ethnonationality is one of the most sensitive political issues for elites in post-Soviet Central Asia. The legacy of Soviet nationality policy and the 1991 breakup rallied numerous ethnonationalist entrepreneurs. Scholars had anticipated sharp conflict over these issues between both the titular ethnic groups and the Russian diaspora. In assessing the strength of the ethnonational identity in the nonelite, social sphere, the interviews addressed such issues as language, titular-Russian relations, living patterns, and migration. They probed concrete elements of ethnonational identity and its potential connection to conflict.

Studies of intergroup relations within postcolonial states have consistently focused on language laws and conflict.[38] Studies of the early 1990s expected language laws to instigate social protest or play into conflict between the "titulars" and the "Russian colonizers." In the late 1980s ethnonationalist leaders of the Asaba and Birlik movements and even the Central Asian governments themselves pushed for laws adopting a "national" language.[39] The rural population, by contrast, has not made language a political issue. While 94 percent use their titular language at home, on the kolkhoz, and with others of their ethnic group, they speak Russian with nontitulars. Their views on which languages their children should speak are telling. In Uzbekistan 95 percent wanted their children to study English, and 68 percent wanted them to study Russian as well. In Kyrgyzstan 74 percent supported the study of Russian, and 99 percent the study of English. Those who opposed studying Russian explained: "It's not practical; we have no contact with Russians." They were not anticolonial but viewed knowledge of Russian as a mark of status, culture, and education. Nor are they antiwestern. English is superceding Russian as the foreign language deemed necessary for economic advancement, with 72 percent of all preferring English over Russian. Only four respondents suggested the study of Arabic for those other than Islamic teachers. Respondents viewed study of other Central Asian languages in school as "unnecessary." In the bazaar economy that governs their existence, Uzbeks speak Uzbek to Kyrgyz. The latter respond in Kyrgyz. They understand each other.

In marked contrast to the colonial-native tension and negative racial and ethnic

stereotyping found in the Indian subcontinent and much of Africa, titular Central Asians typically stereotype Russians positively as "better educated," "better qualified," and "more professional." For example, 303 of 311 respondents preferred Russian doctors and teachers to Central Asians. Although most declined to answer questions about their local or national government officials, many articulated the opinion that, as one *oqsoqol* said, "perhaps there should be Uzbek leaders in Uzbekistan, but professionalism and honesty are the most important qualities in an official." Over 98 percent claimed that "in Soviet times" there was less corruption, kin favoritism, and patronage on the kolkhoz, in the local administration, and in national politics. Respondents stated that "kin connections" and secondly "the ability to bribe" are now the key to advancement. Likewise, 100 percent of Russian respondents agreed and complained that their lack of clan connections cut them out of political power and jobs. These findings help explain the lack of social hostility against the Russian diaspora.[40]

State efforts have promoted more titular language schools, but the creation of national identities through manipulation of symbols and history has had limited effect on living patterns. State failure to induce the migration of its ethnic brothers suggests a disconnection between the state's ethnonationalism and the local population's concerns. Uzbekistan's efforts since 1992 to entice ethnic Uzbeks to relocate from Kyrgyzstan to Uzbekistan have failed. Among local villagers 96 percent reported "no migration" from Kyrgyzstan to Uzbekistan, despite the rabble-rousing of Uzbek entrepreneurs asserting Kyrgyz governmental discrimination against the Uzbek minority. Ethnonational cohabitation and cooperation are economic, social, and historical realities that have resisted both coercive and noncoercive attempts at alteration.[41]

Overall, respondents exhibited a varying but generally weak sense of state-constructed ethnonational identities, especially in comparison with clan identity. For example, Uzbeks and Tajiks in more urban areas share one culture and socioeconomic status and consider themselves one community. By contrast, the cultural and social distance between an Uzbek from the Khorezm steppe and one from the Ferghana Valley is great. Common responses were: "what does 'Uzbek' mean?" or "there is no such thing." These views may be extreme. Respondents were certainly aware of the political relevance of ethnonationality. Nonetheless, being "Uzbek" or "Kyrgyz" was more the strategic activity of nationalist elites seeking popular legitimacy for nation-state building than an internalization of ethnonational identity. Weak ethnonational identity is not uncommon in the early stages of nation building or in underdeveloped contexts.[42] Yet, when compared with eastern Europe, the Baltics, the Ukraine, or even the Caucasus, the situation in Central Asia is surprising. The lack of conflict and even more the lack of cohesive ethnonational groups after seventy years of Soviet nation building contradict the expectations of most realist, rationalist, and constructivist hypotheses.

Islamic Identity

Islamic identity is the third and increasingly powerful face of culture in Central Asia. Public worship and belief in the Islamic faith are now permitted in a way not possible before 1991, even in the later liberalized Soviet years. The Central Asian states have encouraged the spiritual and civic values taught by the mosque but have sought to minimize Islam's potential for mobilizing a political opposition. The interview questions focused on Islam as a religion, culture, and collective identity and on Islam's actual and potential political role.

A survey conducted in 1993 in Uzbekistan, during the height of a state crackdown on Islam, revealed low identification with Islam.[43] The interview data here, however, revealed almost universal identification with Islam, indicating an increase in religious belief or open identification with Islam. In both cases, 100 percent of respondents viewed themselves as believers. In Uzbekistan 98 percent were Muslim, and 2 percent Christian. In Kyrgyzstan 96 percent were Muslim, and 6 percent Christian. One hundred percent of ethnic Central Asians viewed themselves as Muslim. Typically, respondents expressed surprise at the question. Over 50 percent voluntarily added: "no one in our village is not a believer." Of 311 respondents 308 asserted "a difference between believers and nonbelievers," indicating group identification along religious boundaries. "Soviets" were considered atheist, but even former Communist Party members claimed to have "only pretended to be nonbelievers before the authorities," while carrying on religious rituals in private.[44]

Scholars of Central Asian Islam have distinguished between formal and informal Islam. The former was approved and controlled by the Soviet state; the latter included cultural traditions and beliefs that survived Soviet repression.[45] This distinction obscures the complexity of Islam under the Soviet Union, but a similar two-tiered Islam persists today.[46] Formally, Islam's sociopolitical role is circumscribed, despite its cultural and religious revival, and despite the marked decline in state restrictions on Islamic institutions and practice. Two aspects of Islam's relationship to the community suggest its limits. First, in Soviet and pre-Soviet days Islam was subordinate to Central Asian communal structure and continues to be today. The *mahalla* or *qishloq* committee—an unofficial, nonstate, communal governing body—generally includes a religious leader, *domla* or *imom*, who is always subordinate to the *oqsoqol*s and *el-bashi komiteti* (committee chairman).[47] Religious instruction, the village mosque, and funding for religious activities are supervised by the predominantly secular committee. Second, the authority of the religious teacher is highly specific. Although trained at a *madrasa*, he is first and foremost a local, clan figure. Over 96 percent of villagers claimed they would reject a religious authority from another region. Islam therefore remains informally institutionalized within and subordinate to the clan.

Since 1993 Islamic literature has proliferated in the local Turkic languages.

Although strict scriptural tradition requires reading the Qur'an in Arabic, Muslim spiritual leaders throughout Central Asia have opted for the rapid expansion of Islamic learning at the expense of conservative religious rules. The rapid and cheap distribution of such literature has enabled the mosque to cultivate a wider and more informed following. Mullas, *domlas*, and *oqsoqol*s use the sacred texts to teach young and old within the villages. The Tashkent *madrasa* houses 350 full-time male students and 100 female students each year. While the entire Soviet Union had only 450 mosques, by 1998 a mosque had been built by *hashar* (collective participation) in almost every village, including over 3,000 in the Uzbek Ferghana Valley alone.[48] Local administrations in Osh, Ferghana, and Namangan oblasts each estimated that since 1992 3,000 to 4,000 residents have performed the *hajj*, one of the five pillars of Islam. Yet popular adherence to Islamic rituals indicates a gap between knowledge and actual practice of Islam.[49] While attendance at the mosque on Friday was on the rise, generally young boys and the elderly, not working-age men, went to prayers.

Rituals such as circumcision, Navruz, and fasting during Ramadan have also been resurrected. Most respondents could not differentiate among "Muslim," "ethnonational," and "local" traditions.[50] The cultural revival has seen a resurgence of Islam together with nomadic customs. Popular preference has been for the traditional local expression of Islam. Mullas attempting to change such rituals are rejected by the local community, as have been "foreign" versions of Islam.[51] Hence the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) and the Taliban have rallied few local adherents. More recently, Hizb-ut-Tahrir and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), associated with the 1999 and 2000 guerrilla incursions into southern Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, have not received local support in their campaign against the Central Asian states. They rely instead on transnational terrorist networks, including the Afghan Arabs.

Islamic courts and the Sharia were prevalent in parts of Central Asia in pre-Soviet days but were eliminated by Soviet fiat on December 12, 1917, and abolished by force over the next twenty years. Post-Soviet regimes have likewise suppressed the Sharia, but all respondents knew its basic laws on marriage, divorce, sexuality, and thievery.

To assess popular knowledge and adherence to the Sharia, I presented respondents with scenarios testing its prescriptions. In Uzbekistan over 25 percent (fifty-three) and in Kyrgyzstan about 5 percent (five) of respondents, all from Ferghana Valley regions, strongly supported two Shariatic laws: stoning to death a woman who commits adultery and cutting off the hand of a thief. Only 3 percent of these respondents claimed that they "would make no exceptions" to these codes, "even for our own children. The punishment should be carried out if, according to the law, three witnesses could verify the crimes." Most justified such punishment in terms of the "communal good." However, when asked how often such punishments were meted

out, 100 percent claimed: "Never, because such crimes do not happen in our village." With such social monitoring in village life, this explanation is credible. Discussion followed about preserving the social fabric, norms, and values binding the community together. Conservative practices, such as covering women and keeping them at home, were encouraged as "Islamic" and "proper" by Ferghana Valley residents. By contrast, appealing to their "nomadic tribal traditions," respondents from northern Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan universally rejected such strict adherence to the Sharia.

Even supporters of a strict Sharia claimed that the state law "does not allow" such punishments. Overall, less than 1 percent (four respondents) supported adopting the Sharia without its "prior legalization" by the state. Respondents may have simply been afraid to express support for the Sharia. Yet even those espousing its harshest laws consistently explained their position: "in Central Asia there has never been an Islamic state. We are not Afghanistan or Saudi Arabia. Islam and the state have always been separate, even before the Soviet regime." The vast majority (94 percent) advocated social elements of a more conservative Islamic order—including strict sexual behavior for women, limited consumption of alcohol, respect for elders and family, and social order—but almost 100 percent preferred to enforce norms at the village level without resort to the state. Knowledge of the Taliban movement and the Tajik war had generated widespread social antipathy for political Islam. 100 percent of respondents expressed disdain for "calls to jihad" and skepticism of "Islam's ability to solve political or economic problems."

Only in Tajikistan is the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) legal and active. Although the media commonly portrays the Tajik people as qualitatively "more Islamic" and "more fundamentalist" than their neighbors, surveys reveal a level of Islam on a par with Uzbekistan or Kyrgyzstan. Over 97 percent of Tajiks proclaimed to be Muslim, "believers in Allah," but 78 percent stated that they did not attend Friday mosque, and 59 percent claimed not to pray at all.[52] Given a range of political, clan, and Islamic leaders to choose from in the survey, 60 percent professed trust in the president, and 25 percent in their "clan leader," while only 1 percent trusted parliamentarians, any political party, and Islamic leaders.[53] Other studies have revealed very little Tajik support for an Islamic state or parties, including the IRP. Indeed, despite his Islamic agenda, the Tajik Islamic leader Qazi Ali Akbar Turadzhonzoda rallied his social base from his own kolkhoz and clan. Opposition to the IRP from other Tajik mullas, also drawing on regional clan support, indicates Islam's weak unifying force.

Islam pervades Central Asian society as an inextricable element of its culture, socioeconomic life, and history. Nonetheless, as in the pre-Soviet and Soviet eras, Islam's strength is also its weakness. Pervasive and diffuse, Islam does not provide a cohesive and cogent political identity. It is not an identity that marks deep political

cleavages within society. It has neither become a tool for discriminating against the non-Islamic population nor a banner for fundamentalism.[54]

Potential for Clan Conflict

Although clans have been the critical variable in maintaining social stability in post-Soviet Central Asia, collective clan identities are not immutable. They decrease but do not wholly exclude the likelihood of conflict along ethnonational or religious lines. Even where intergroup cooperation exists, the state remains a potentially important player that may either facilitate or disrupt clan stability. In Central Asia the state has done both.

Central Asia's economic transition, especially privatization of the kolkhozy, has explosive potential. In Uzbekistan, for example, the state has replaced some traditional kolkhoz directors of other ethnonationalities with Uzbeks, typically of the cadre and clan of the Uzbek *hokim*s (district or regional governors). A powerful position, the kolkhoz director controls extensive material resources, land, and a potentially great profit from cotton production. The director also controls the livelihoods of several villages, perhaps 10,000–20,000 people. By thus upsetting traditional local power, the state may create ethnonational tension.

Favoritism for "titulars" by the current regimes has already led to the emergence of ethnic entrepreneurs and rabble-rousers. In Uzbekistan the Tajik Cultural Organization has sought to mobilize ethnic Tajiks against the elimination of Tajik-language schools, the removal of Tajik collective farm directors, the expulsion of Tajik refugees, and the economic neglect of Tajik-dominated regions. Yet Tajik leaders have little support from the Tajik minority. In Kyrgyzstan parliamentary deputy Sobirov, representing Uzbek-dominated Djalalabad region, has sponsored an Uzbek-language media that seeks to politicize the Uzbek minority. Since 1995 he has unsuccessfully lobbied for more Uzbek schools and political representation. Despite his ethnic rabble-rousing and economic and political discrimination against the Uzbek minority in Kyrgyzstan, no ethnic outbreaks have occurred since independence. There has been little migration to Uzbekistan or support for secession.

The intersection of Islamic and clan identity can not be fully explored here, but the interview data suggest several issues. First, the degree of Islamicization has varied over both time and space within Central Asia. Although almost 100 percent identified themselves as believers and "Muslim," there are different Islamic practices, religious and cultural, across regions. Namanganliks, for instance, have typically perceived Khorzemliks as "less Islamic."[55] Conversely, respondents from nomadic regions perceived Ferghana as "conservative, backwards, and fundamentalist." Since early 1998 regional perceptions of other regions as "not just Islamic" but "fundamentalist" have sharpened due to state propaganda and fear of the Taliban.

Meanwhile, the Karimov government's harsh repression of Islam has instigated certain clan opposition, adding Islamic overtones to preexisting clan rivalries.

Indeed, the clan unit, neatly and tightly organized within the village and on the kolkhoz, holds within its structure the means of disseminating myths of violence, instigating fear, and mobilizing in defense of the social unit. Where clans are ethnically homogeneous, the threat of clans spreading ethnic distrust is higher.[56] Likewise, Islamic cleavages do sometimes reinforce clan cleavages, and clan-based conflict could take on religious dimensions, thus exaggerating violence. Nonetheless, the evidence does not support primordialist arguments that clans (much less ethnicity or religion) cause conflict. Rather, clans shape its form and fault-lines. If and when mobilization occurs, the conflict will likely be personalistic and protracted, driven by norms of avenging kin. Clan conflict could even destabilize the regime and state, as in Tajikistan in 1992.[57]

Violence did occur in the Soviet period: in 1989 in Ferghana, Uzbekistan, and in 1990 in Osh, Kyrgyzstan. It was triggered by the transfer of land along both ethnic and clan lines.[58] The rioting did not, however, indicate deep-seated ethnic or religious hatreds or future ethnic violence. Although these events have typically been labeled ethnic conflicts, Tishkov's anthropological study revealed conflict over land instigated by government officials who may have paid youth to foment violence.[59] Local experts and villagers assert that both "clan competition at elite levels of government" and "KGB interests in destabilizing the region" motivated the events.[60] These outbreaks were rapidly controlled through the intercession of local clan elites, the village elders. Furthermore, those elites have successfully controlled the antipathy and potential for recurring violence through communal dialogue and strong "informal monitoring" of youth.

The cohesive clan identity and structure of both the Kyrgyz and Uzbek groups enabled them rapidly to spread fear and information about a group threat and to arm, mobilize, and kill in their groups' interests. Village clans behaved similarly during the Tajik civil war. The incidents exhibited the potential for clan collective action and the destructiveness with which this segmented society can respond when the very foundation of survival—clan, not ethnonationality or Islam—is under threat.

Conclusions

The data presented here make it possible to evaluate the sociopolitical strength and relevance of clan identities at the social level, in comparison with ethnonational and religious identities, and to observe the inner workings of clan networks—their socioeconomic base and functions—and the collective identity they provide. These data suggest some broader conclusions and propositions about conflict, stability, and clan identity.

Since 1991 the social transition has been relatively stable in Central Asia. Ethnonationality and Islamic identities coexist with clan identity. Yet clan structures, as informal institutions and collective identities located in the villages, have largely stabilized a potentially explosive situation. By informally providing access to goods, resources, and jobs, the clan has provided a social safety net that enables its members to survive the transition. Without undermining the latter, clan networks have mitigated both economic deprivation and identity politics.

Ethnicity and nationalism, in contrast to the clan, are not rooted in the social and economic foundations of a traditional or semimodern society. Titular ethnic identity is a constructed notion, an identity created by Soviet institutions and Soviet nationality policy over seventy years. Conflict does not simply erupt when strategic elites draw upon ethnicity for political ends. Mobilizing a population around ethnonational demands requires a social base identifying with those claims. Powerful social networks can undermine interest in ethnonational claims or the political system generally, and ethnic rabble-rousers find little social resonance. A similar logic applies to the question of religious identity in Central Asia. The Soviet regime ironically strengthened the Christian-Muslim distinction by eventually relenting on "scientific atheism" and instead sponsoring a statist Islam. Yet Central Asians have not coalesced along Islamic lines in opposition to the Christian/Russian population. Islam has shown no supralocal unifying force.

Uzbek respondents exhibited a stronger sense of ethnonationality than Kyrgyz or Tajiks. However, in none of the cases did ethnonational identity supercede clan identity and lead to mobilization and conflict. Nor has greater identification with Islam in the Ferghana regions led to support for religious mobilization or conflict. Reluctance on the part of Central Asians to group or mobilize themselves according to ethnonationality or religion is due to the very strong presence of a competing collective identity, clan identity. An identity that is neither ideologically constructed nor wholly imagined, clans are collective identities that are also informal social networks with powerful normative and socioeconomic rationales. In informally aggregating and defending interests, clans trump identities of a formal institutionalized nature.

Clans have thus been extremely beneficial in maintaining social and economic stability during the tumult and trauma of the post-Soviet transition. In offering a competing collective identity, clans have decreased the potential for ethnonational or religious conflict. More generally, clan or kin social structures in Asia and Africa have had a similarly stabilizing effect during transitions.[61] Where social structures have broken down or been destroyed by colonialism, ethnonationalism and fundamentalism may have a stronger appeal. Social identities are multiple, constructed, and fluid, but are also "congealed reputations" neither infinitely nor quickly malleable.[62] Beyond the constructivist-primordial debate, the clan imposes limits on the power of ethnonational and religious identity construction and mobilization.[63] However, even absent such identity conflict, national elites face great challenges in

building a nation-state from a clan-based society. Once the balance of clan or patronage power is disrupted and the state breaks down, clan lines become clearly visible, and clan warfare extremely personalistic and vengeful; reestablishing trust and cooperation across clan boundaries becomes very difficult. The kinship element of clan conflicts makes them particularly intractable. As the Tajik case so vividly exemplifies, conflict based on identities deeply ingrained in the social structure and fabric of a state are extremely difficult to resolve. It is still unclear how elites will succeed in building new state institutions or in reunifying the already divided social networks within the state.

The interview data strongly support the argument that clan identity remains powerful in Central Asia. Clan identity is firmly rooted in both the informal (village) and formalized (kolkhoz) socioeconomic structures; it was neither destroyed nor subsumed by the Soviet campaign to create republic-based ethnonational identities. Even now, clans have not been destroyed by the post-Soviet leaders' attempts to construct national identities as the legitimate basis of their new Central Asian nation-states. These informal identities have limited the ability of elites to construct new identities and to mobilize society according to them. Finally, the clan system in Central Asia deterred other identity-based movements and has thus significantly contributed to ethnonational and religious stability during the post-Soviet transition. However, clan-based stability is a double-edged sword, for it can also potentially destabilize these states.

NOTES

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1. Ted Gurr, *People versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century* (Washington, D.C.: USIP Press, 2000), pp. 34–39.

2. See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 1991); Ronald Suny, *Revenge of the Past* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1993); and Peter Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).

3. Research on ethnic/identity conflict in international relations theory often takes identity as given. V. P. Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Security: The Case of Serbia," *International Security*, 19 (Winter 1994–1995), 130–66; Steven Van Evera, "Nationalism and the Causes of War," in Charles Kupchan, ed., *Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995); Barry Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," *Survival,* 35 (Spring 1993); Ted Robert Gurr, *Minorities at Risk* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute for Peace, 1993); and Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).

4. Conflict here refers to intracommunal or intercommunal group violence within a state. I adopt Gurr's measure and scale for coding ethnopolitical conflict. Gurr, p. 31.

5. I use the term "ethnonational" rather then "ethnic" or "national" to suggest the political linkage between them. "Religious" identity refers to Islam and Muslim-Christian relations. Scholarly studies gen-

erally focus on postsocialist conflict as the consequence of "ethnic" and/or "Islamic" revival and transitional conflict. Daniel Treisman, "Russia's 'Ethnic Revival': The Separatist Activism of Regional Leaders in a Postcommunist Order," *World Politics,* 49 (January 1997); Nancy Lubin et al., *Calming the Ferghana Valley* (New York: Century Foundation Press, 1999); Valery Tishkov, *The Mind Aflame: Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict after the Soviet Union* (Stockholm: Sage, 1997); Alexander Malashenko, "Islam v post-sovetskom souze" [Islam in the post-Soviet Union], in Roald Sagdeev, ed., *Konflict v SNG* [Conflict in the CIS](Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Foundation, 1997); David Laitin, *Identity in Formation: The Russian Speaking Population in the Near Abroad* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); Valerie Bunce, *Subversive Institutions: The Design and Destruction of Socialism and the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Philip Roeder, "Peoples and States after 1989: The Political Costs of Incomplete National Revolutions," *Slavic Studies,* 58 (Winter 1999); and Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

6. Ronald Suny, "Provisional Stabilities: The Politics of Identity in Post-Soviet Eurasia," *International Security,* 24 (Winter 2000), 164; Treisman, p. 231.

7. Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983). Soviet "modernization" was haphazard and incomplete, with unintended consequences. See Francine Hirsch, "Empire of Nations: Colonial Technologies and the Making of the Soviet Union, 1917–1939" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1998).

8. This case selection allows variation on the dependent variable, since Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are cases of peace and Tajikistan a case of conflict. Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan allow variation on several independent variables (regime type, economic reform, and state policies towards ethnicity), suggesting that they do not explain stability/conflict.

9. See Kathleen Collins, "Clans, Pacts, and Politics: Understanding Regime Transition in Central Asia" (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1999), chs. 2 and 3.

10. Culturalist, constructivist, instrumentalist, and institutionalist accounts generally define and explain conflict as ethnic, making fixed assumptions about ethnicity. See Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," *International Security,* 23 (1998); Philip Roeder, "Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization," *World Politics,* 43 (January 1991), 196–232; James Fearon and David Laitin, "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation," *American Political Science Review,* 90 (December 1996), 715–35; Robert Bates, "Modernization and Ethnic Competition: The Rationality of Politics in Contemporary Africa," in Donald Rothchild and Victor Olorunsola, eds., *States versus Ethnic Claims* (Boulder: Westview, 1983); and Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973).

11. Tishkov, ch. 1; Gurr, ch. 1.

12. Jack Snyder, *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2000).

13. Jim Fearon and Barry Weingast, "The Politics of Interpretation, Rationality, Culture, and Transition," *Politics and Society,* 26 (June 1998), 242–46. For a critique, see Donald Horowitz, *The Deadly Ethnic Riot* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), pp. 548–50.

14. Gurr's data set includes Russians in Central Asia but excludes most other minorities. Gurr, Table D-2, p. 324.

15. Exceptions include Barnett Rubin, "Russian Hegemony and State Breakdown in the Periphery: Causes and Consequences of the Civil War," in Barnett Rubin and Jack Snyder, eds., *Post-Soviet Political Order* (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 128–61; and Gail Lapidus, "Contested Sovereignty: The Tragedy of Chechnya," *International Security*, 23 (Summer 1998).

16. Horowitz, p. 547, argues that early violence breeds antipathy, fear, and later violence.

17. Fearon and Laitin, pp. 715–17.

18. David Laitin, *Hegemony and Culture: Politics and Religious Change among the Yoruba* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), ch. 1.

19. Susan Goodrich Lehmann, "Interethnic Conflict in the Republics of Russia in Light of Religious Revival," *Post-Soviet Geography and Economy,* 39 (1998), 461–93.

20. For a theoretical and empirical discussion of clan, see Collins, ch. 3.

21. Anthropologists argue that kinship is both biological and fictive, especially in nonwestern societies. Sylvia Yanagasako, *Gender and Kinship* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987). Rather than make complex but not analytically useful distinctions among tribe, clan, quasi-clan, lineage, and family, I adopt the term "clan," acknowledging its semifictive nature. Adrienne Edgar, "Genealogy, Class, and Tribal Policy in Soviet Turkmenistan: 1924–1934," *Slavic Review,* 60 (Summer 2001), 266–88, notes the semimythical genealogical basis of Turkmen tribes and clans.

22. The new institutionalism and transaction costs approaches provide a compelling rational argument for clans. Informal ties and norms reduce transaction costs in a weakly institutionalized environment because repeated interaction over time, social monitoring, and reputation within the network make defection or cheating very costly to the transgressor. Douglass North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Oliver Williamson, ed., *The Economics of Transaction Costs* (Northampton: Edward Elgar, 1989); Avner BenNer and Louis Putterman, eds., *Economics, Values, and Organizations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

23. Donald Rothchild, *Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1997).

24. S. M. Eisenstadt and Ernest Gellner, *Patrons, Clients, and Friends* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). Others define ethnicity broadly, incorporating all ascriptive group characteristics. Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 41–53. Although ethnic/national groups often share myths of a common genealogy, they lack the intrinsic network of clans. A broad definition fails to explain why one of many ascriptive identities becomes salient.

25. See Collins, ch. 8.

26. Studying events and nonevents within a set of cases is critical. On selection bias, see Gary King et al., *Designing Social Inquiry* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

27. The Ferghana region includes Namangan, Andijan, Ferghana, Osh, Djalalabad, and Khodjent.

28. Alisher Ilkhamov, "Quasi-Clans and the Shadow Economy in Uzbekistan" (unpublished paper, Harvard University, 2000). He uses the term "quasi-clans," networks based on kinship and localism, to describe elite clans. For terminological simplicity, I use "clan," noting variation among national, regional, and local levels and recently nomadic versus longer settled peoples.

29. Ethnic Uzbeks in both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, especially in Ferghana, have generally been longer settled; their clan has become associated less with a distinct tribal lineage than with a local network. Inhabitants with recent nomadic roots use more traditional clan terminology. It is oversimplified to claim that the populations of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan were settled, while the population of Kyrgyzstan was not.

30. Soviet policies of collectivization and tribal parity ironically kept clans together and reified clan/tribal groups, when the Soviets had sought to eradicate such identities. See Hirsch, ch. 5; Edgar, pp. 287–88.

31. There has been little or no privatization of the *kolkhozy* by the governments in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, which resist economic reform. Kyrgyzstan engaged in a multistage land privatization in the mid 1990s. Most collectives were divided among *kolkhozniki* who have widely reconstituted their collectives on a kinship basis.

32. Ibid., p. 71.

33. Interview with World Bank representative, Bishkek, October 1996. Comparable data on Uzbekistan were unavailable. Official unemployment was 5 percent in 1997, plus 10 percent underemployed.

34. Non-Uzbek out-migration was counterbalanced by Uzbek in-migration. *Migratsiya naseleniya 1995: Statesticheskii sbornik* [Population Migration: 1995 Statistical Handbook] (Toshkent: Goskomstat,

1996). The UNDP gave similar estimates for Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Interview, April 1997.

35. Wagner, p. 110. Of those surveyed, 86 percent were ethnic Uzbek or Tajik.

36. *UNHCR Report on Tajikistan* (Dushanbe: UNHCR, May 1996), pp. 10–19.

37. Political Islam's appeal has generally been to urban youth and intellectuals. Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991). The Taliban, however, were rural.

38. Laitin, *Identity in Formation*, uses language as a proxy for cultural/ethnic group.

39. Author's interviews with leaders of *Asaba* and *Birlik*, December 1995 and March 1997.

40. Survey research conducted in Kazakhstan in 1993, before the language law's resolution, revealed decreasing tension between Russians and Kazakhs. Tishkov, p. 129.

41. They are also found in the Caucasus. Suny, "Provisional Stabilities," p. 155.

42. Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976).

43. Nancy Lubin, "Islam and Ethnic Identity in Central Asia: A View from Below," in Yacov Ro'i, *Muslim Eurasi: Conflicting Legacies* (London: Frank Cass, 1995), p. 58. Lubin's survey, pp. 64–65, suggests that ethnic divisions run deep, but "other" identities (family, community, region) may be more important.

44. Yacov Ro'i, *Islam in the Soviet Union* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), ch. 1.

45. Ibid., p. 289.

46. Mark Saroyan, *Minorities, Mullas, and Modernity* (Berkeley: International and Area Studies, 1997).

47. *Mahalla* is a neighborhood unit.

48. Interviews with *imom*s of Tashkent Madrasa, October 1997, and Osh Friday Mosque, May 1998.

49. Saroyan, ch. 2, notes similar findings in the Caucasus.

50. Adeeb Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998). Muslim was equated with nationality before 1917.

51. Tamara Sivertseeva, *Dagestanskoe selo: voprosi identichnosti* [The Dagestani Village: Questions of Identity] (Moscow: Tipografia GPIB, 1999), ch. 3.

52. Wagner, *Public Opinion in Tajikistan,* p. 106.

53. Ibid., p. 106. The random sample survey covered four oblasts. Surveys clearly reflect fear of directly criticizing the president.

54. On the lack of politicized religious cleavages in Russia, see Lehmann, p. 493.

55. The Turkic suffix "lik" denotes a clan village and localism.

56. See Ashutosh Varshney, "Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society: India and Beyond," *World Politics,* 53 (April 2001), 362–98.

57. On the Tajik civil war, see Rubin, pp. 147–48; and Kathleen Collins, "Prolonging Civil Conflict: The Case of Tajikistan," in Chandra Sriram and Karen Wermerster, eds., *From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention of Violent Conflict* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002).

58. Charles Tilly, "Contentious Conversation," *Social Research,* 65 (Fall 1998), 491–511.

59. Tishkov, pp. 136–37. Rubin, p. 169, categorizes the Osh/Ferghana incidents as related to housing and land scarcity, "aggravated by lack of clarity over ethnic and national rights."

60. Based on interviews with villagers, elders, government officials, and scholars in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, 1997–2000.

61. On the strength of local social structures, see James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999); Rothchild, ch. 7.

62. Hopf, p. 171.

63. Suny, "Provisional Stabilities," p. 169.